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Abstract 
BLECICH, KIMBERLY L. Market Mechanisms and Price Volatility in New York 
Electricity Markets. Department of Economics, June 2013. 
 
ADVISOR: Professor J. Douglass Klein 
 
The past two decades have born witness to a cascade of new legislation and 
market design measures to restructure the United States’ electric power industry from 
price-setting regulatory agencies to competitive markets.  Deregulation was intended to 
increase competition and improve market efficiency while preserving the reliability of the 
transmission system.  Results have varied in success, and deregulation has invariably led 
to an increase in both the overall price level of electricity and volatility of those prices.  
Investigating these deregulation consequences is crucial for market operations and 
retrospective analyses of deployed mechanism outcomes. 
The objective of this study is to extend the methodological research of Hadsell 
(2007) in examination of the effect of three market deployments and one exogenous 
factor on price volatility in the Capital Zone of the New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO) markets.  To accomplish this end, a Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is used to model the conditional 
variance, or volatility, of a constructed return series of Real-Time prices. 
The GARCH models found an association between the three market deployments 
and a reduction in price volatility.  These variables included: Lake Erie Loop Flow 
mitigation measures; establishment of a centralized wind forecasting system; and 
economic dispatch of wind resources.  Furthermore, this study confirmed the association 
of Thunderstorm Alert (TSA) announcements and an increase in price volatility.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed a cascade of new legislation and market 
design measures to restructure the U.S. electric power industry.  Until the onset of 
deregulation, regulatory agencies governed the locally monopolistic, investor-owned 
utilities (IOUs) and power pools that distributed power across individual states and 
regions.  Reform of this vertically tiered generation, transmission, and distribution system 
has transformed this industry from one in which regulatory agencies set prices to one 
where markets determine the price level.  Deregulation was intended to increase 
competition and improve market efficiency while preserving the reliability of the 
transmission systems. 
Unfortunately, the outcomes of these deregulation efforts have varied in their 
success.  Failure was exemplified in California’s attempted transformation in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  Due to partial-deregulation of this state’s markets, further 
exacerbated by drought-diminished hydropower production and limitations on the natural 
gas supply, the structure plunged multiple IOUs as well as the entire State of California 
into financial distress (Sweeney, 2006).  By contrast, New York successfully moved from 
its state-regulated New York Power Pool (NYPP) to the New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO), an “independent entity” authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission to operate New York’s wholesale electricity markets (NYISO, 2011).  These 
two cases are ideal for a comparative study of the deregulation process and potential 
outcomes. 
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A shared negative characteristic of all deregulated markets is an associated 
increase in price volatility following the implementation of the reforms.  Due to the 
nature of electricity production, higher price volatility is an inherent outcome in this 
competitive market when compared to traditional commodity markets (Hadsell et al., 
2004; Benini et al., 2002).  Furthermore, Johnston (2001) confirmed broad consensus that 
deregulation has been accompanied by an increase in price level.  The transition from 
regulatory agencies to wholesale competitive markets has undoubtedly brought increases 
in both the overall price level of electricity as well as the volatility of these prices. 
Hadsell et al. (2004, 24) and Benini et al.l (2002, 1354) state the benefits of 
understanding these characteristics of the electricity market are numerous, and include, 
but are certainly not limited to, future spot price forecasting, proper risk management, 
and understanding the overall impact of deregulation. 
Electricity market operators conduct continuous refinements in an attempt to 
reduce price volatility through various market design implementations.  Hadsell (2007), 
for example, finds a link between the implementation of a market mechanism called 
virtual bidding and a reduction in price volatility in the NYISO markets.  Published 
literature has confirmed the value of analyzing price volatility, by itself and in relation to 
measures taken to address its presence as well.  These studies have been conducted on 
markets around the world, ranging from England and Wales (Tashpulatov, 2011) to 
Australia (Thomas and Mitchell, 2007).  Many more have considered markets within the 
United States, a number of which are discussed herein.  However, very few have 
explored price volatility in New York markets. 
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Hadsell (2007) is the primary source for this analysis on price volatility in New 
York electricity markets.  Where he showed an associated link between virtual bidding 
and a reduction in market price volatility, this study will extend his methodological 
research to examine the individual effect of three additional NYISO market design 
mechanisms and one exogenous factor on price volatility in the Capital Zone of the New 
York markets.  Specifically, this paper employs a Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to investigate the following: 
implementation of the Lake Erie Loop Flow mitigation measures; establishment of a 
centralized wind forecasting system; inclusion of wind resources in NYISO’s economic 
dispatch; and announcement of Thunderstorm Alert (TSA) events. 
Given the objectives and nature of the three implemented policies, it is expected 
that they will be associated with a reduction in price volatility after their effective date.  
In contrast, there is a predicted increase in price volatility associated with TSAs due to 
increased costs related to the sequence of events that follows such an alert. 
The following chapter provides an overview of the electricity market deregulation 
transition, assorted outcomes, and further refinements introduced specifically within New 
York markets.  The third chapter presents the collected data and describes the analytical 
approach and econometric tools used in this study.  Presentation and analysis of the 
empirical results follows in the fourth chapter.  The study concludes in a final chapter 
discussing policy implications, shortcomings of the current research, and suggestions for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Overview and Review of Existing Literature 
This chapter explores the progression of electricity markets through the 
deregulation process.  In a chronological format, it begins by providing an account of the 
transition from the regulated era to the current state of deregulated markets.  This is 
succeeded by a review of literature on the process outcomes, paying particular attention 
to the consequential increase in price level and volatility within the markets and an 
exploration of the dissimilar cases of California and New York.  Conclusively, this 
chapter addresses a number of market refinements NYISO has made after its 
establishment as the wholesale electricity market operator. 
 
2.1 Regulation Era 
Prior to the onset of deregulation in the U.S. electric power industry, regulatory 
agencies governed various locally monopolistic investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and 
power pools that distributed power across individual states and regions.  While 
generation, transmission, and distribution generally took the form of vertically-structured, 
regulated monopolies (NYISO, 2011, 1), various arrangements included, but were not 
limited to, the configuration of Power Pools, reliance on voluntary multiple utility 
cooperative management, or domination by a select few electric companies.  Focusing on 
two case studies set herein, California and New York present two different forms of 
regulated transmission systems prior to the deregulation period and are an excellent 
model of contrastive solutions to the distribution of power. 
 
	  5 
2.1.1 Local Monopolies: California 
During the regulated era, power across the State of California was provided by 
three major investor-owned utilities (IOUs): Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), 
Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E).  As is 
evident of Figure 2.1, there existed additional smaller utilities and specific municipal 
power suppliers like the Los Angeles Power and Electric Company; however, the three 
primary IOUs supplied 78% of the state with power (Sweeney, 2006, 320).  The utilities’ 
vertical integration often meant that generation, transmission, and local distribution were 
controlled by these area-specific monopolies.  While their financial decisions were 
subject to regulation by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), conducted 
analyses determined that, rather than reflecting market conditions, market prices were 
based primarily on cost of service (Sweeny, 2006, 320). 
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Figure 2.1: California Distribution Zones by Utility: Regulation Era 
1996 
(Source: Sweeney, 2006) 
 
2.1.2 Power Pool: New York 
While a limited number of electric utilities also supplied New York power prior to 
deregulation, their fate took a twist unlike that of California.  Operating in a voluntary 
cooperative effort, the following eight companies primarily controlled the New York 
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electric distribution network: Consolidated Edison, Long Island Lighting Company, New 
York State Electric & Gas Company, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Orange & 
Rockland Company, Rochester Gas & Electric Company, Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Company, and the New York Power Authority (Tierney and Kahn, 2007, 5).  However, 
after twenty-five million people were left without power for a maximum of twelve hours 
during the Great Northeast Blackout on November 9, 1965, these companies deemed it 
necessary to form a statewide wholesale institution (NYISO, “NYISO Timeline,” 2012; 
Tierney and Kahn, 2007).  The New York Power Pool (NYPP) was funded by state-
regulated consumer rates to operate grid management and reliability functions including, 
but not limited to, economic dispatch of generators and balancing real time supply and 
demand (NYISO, 2011; Tierney and Kahn, 2007).  However, utilities were able to 
commit their units as they saw fit, rather than allowing NYPP to choose from all state 
units as in a centralized unit commitment system characteristic of other power pools of 
the northeast.  This limited the pool of available plants and reduced the efficiency of the 
choices made by NYPP in economic dispatch (Tierney and Kahn, 2007, 5-6). 
 
2.2 Deregulation Process 
2.2.1 Why Deregulate? 
 
Although electricity systems of the regulated era were not unsuccessful in 
providing electric power to consumers, many experts of the time contended that these 
were not as economically efficient as was possible, dominated as they were by regulated 
monopolies (Sweeney, 2002, 2).  Deregulation was thus an attempt to stimulate 
competition among market participants; this was presumed to carry the additional result 
of lowering the high system costs and corresponding retail rates (NYISO, 2011, 1; 
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Sweeney, 2006, 326).  A component of the high prices included concern that utilities 
were not dispatching the next least-cost resource, but providing generation from plants as 
desired without concern for minimizing costs (Sweeney, 2006, 326).  Proponents of 
deregulation stressed such projected economic benefits, which provided ample support 
for progression into the deregulation process. 
 
2.2.2 Influence of England and Wales 
Power pools of the Northeast provided evidence that electricity distribution could 
be managed efficiently through one organization.  The establishment of the England and 
Wales wholesale electricity market added further fuel to the movement for change in 
electric power distribution management (O’Neill et al., 2006).  This sprawling 
transmission system was established in April 1990 and transcended boundaries between 
the two countries, providing electricity to a wide expanse of territory (Green, 1998).  
According to Green (1998): 
The ideological beliefs underlying the restructuring were 
that private ownership and the profit motive gave far better 
incentives than the most benevolent kind of state 
control…and that competitive private industries gave better 
results than monopolies. (2) 
 
The market’s use of auction pricing managed by a central grid company 
demonstrated the ability of a chief management body to successfully handle a diverse 
array of supply and demand requirements (Tashpulatov, 2011).  The rules and 
accomplishments of the England and Wales market in combination with the success of 
power pools within the Northeast of the United States provided strong evidence in 
support of centrally organized markets in the United States (O’Neill et al., 2006). 
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2.2.3 Deregulation Legislation 
Establishment of auction-based markets managed by a centralized body was 
furthered through a series of acts and orders initiating the transformation of the varying 
operational systems established in California and New York.  Restructuring movements 
began with the establishment of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 
(PURPA).  This required the purchase of power from smaller generating facilities, or 
“qualifying facilities” (QFs), by utilities in an attempt to increase investment in 
renewable and cogeneration power plants and boost competition (O’Neill et al., 2006, 
481); the payment rates were based on the “avoided cost” of producing the power from 
their own generating units (Sweeney, 2006, 324).  Although O’Neill et al. (2006, 483) 
states the 1980s and early 1990s were witness to a decline in PURPA-driven investment 
due to “declining fossil fuel prices, reductions in renewable energy subsidies, qualifying 
tests and other factors,” Figure 2.2 provides evidence that investment in QFs specifically 
within California significantly increased after the establishment of this Act, so much so 
that the total capacity of QFs brought online from 1978 to the beginning of January 2000 
exceeded that of the combined output of invested conventional and nuclear generation.   
Although PURPA could force utilities to purchase some power from QFs, these 
companies still controlled transmission lines.  To combat this competition issue and 
motivated by the success of PURPA in generating investment in independent QFs, the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) was implemented across the country requiring 
open-access for transmission lines to non-utilities (O’Neill et al., 2006, 483; Sweeney, 
2006, 325).  Further force would be given to this act four years later when the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 888. 
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Figure 2.2: “Qualifying Facility” Generation: New Plant Construction 
1978 – January 2000 
(Source: Sweeney, 2006) 
 
With pressure for more competition among utilities, it was only logical to begin 
formulating the basic concepts of an established market with a centralized organizational 
body.  California issued its “Blue Book” on March 31, 1994, which drew on the rules of 
the England and Wales market to lay down a proposal for a competitive wholesale market 
(Joskow, 2006).  The principles of a centralized market manager were expanded upon in 
FERC Order 889 in 1996, and provided the basis for the creation of Independent System 
Operators (ISOs) that would organize and administer the wholesale electricity markets.  
ISOs were to be separate from political and federal agendas, although still subject to the 
jurisprudence of FERC.  Finally, divestiture of utilities and their generators was both 
strongly encouraged by the New York State Public Service Commission’s Competitive 
Opportunities Proceedings in 1997 (NYISO, 2011; NYISO, “NYISO Timeline,” 2012) 
and highly incentivized by the CPUC in California in 1998.  The latter required the 
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divestiture of 50% of generation, and provided generous financial incentives for the 
latter; by April of 1999, all utilities had separated from their generators (Sweeney, 2006, 
329; 338). 
 
2.2.4 Restructuring Architecture 
Joskow (2006) and Littlechild (2006) provide an interesting theoretical approach 
behind deregulation, outlined as “textbook architecture” for restructuring; when followed 
appropriately, the steps promote competition and ensure the success of electricity 
markets.  Process privatization is one of the most important aspects enabling fair 
competition without influence by political or participating parties.  Removal of vertical 
monopolies and creation of a horizontally competitive industry of utilities and generators 
go far to both ensure that one market participant cannot dominate or manipulate market 
prices as well as to enable easier supervision of all market players.  Implementation of 
regulations such as Order 888 ensuring transmission line access to non-utilities promotes 
new generation participation and works to add competition on the power supply side.  
These steps were completed prior to the issuances of Order 889 and later legislation, 
which advance the subsequent components of restructuring.  Contractual and real-time 
energy and ancillary markets ensure economically efficient distribution of power and 
should be administered by a central impartial ISO.  To ensure competition in the retail 
realm, inhibiting factors such as retail tariffs must be removed; to ease transition into a 
competitive retail market, it will be necessary to help power suppliers until such 
competition is ensured, exemplified by California’s attempts at stranded cost recovery.  
Finally, for such a transition to succeed, independent regulatory agencies must be able to 
ensure competition is promoted and additional efforts must be given to anticipate 
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potential issues arising during this process of deregulation (Joskow, 2006, xvii; 
Littlechild, 2006, 4-6). 
 
2.3 Deregulation Outcomes 
2.3.1 Unintended Consequences: Price Level and Volatility 
  Electricity markets produce characteristically higher levels of price volatility, 
attributable to many reasons, which include the physical nature of electricity as non-
storable, inelastic demand for its supply, and unpredictable prices of inputs (Hadsell et 
al., 2004, 23; Benini et al., 2002, 1354).  These can cause significant difficulties in 
maintaining overall stability of the grid due to the challenge of constantly matching 
generation supply with demand for power (Borenstein, 2001, 2).  In terms of volatility, 
Hadsell et al. (2004, 23) reports that deregulated competitive wholesale markets “exhibit 
levels of price volatility unparalleled in traditional commodity markets.”  Deregulation 
did not appear to alleviate this volatility nor decrease the overall price level; indeed, 
common to all deregulated markets, were characteristic increases in both.  Johnston 
(2007, 1) testifies that those states that have undergone deregulation portray a 
characteristically greater increase in prices than those who remained with government-set 
price levels.  This is indeed supported by findings of the U.S. Energy Department, who 
reported a near-tripling price level difference charged to industrial companies 
participating in regulated versus deregulated markets between 1999 and July 2006 
(Johnston, 2007, 1).  
Increases in price level and volatility were not characteristics confined to 
deregulated markets in the United States.  Tashpulatov (2011) examined the volatility of 
prices in the England and Wales electricity market from 1990 through 2001.  As 
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discussed above, the rules of this market were highly influential in the reconstruction and 
resulting structure of the United States markets.  While Tashpulatov (2011) determined 
the implementation of a price-cap was successful in reducing prices, it also increased 
volatility.  The subsequent utility divestiture of generation and distribution was associated 
with a reversal of this trend; while volatility decreased, the overall price level increased.  
A reduction in both measures was only apparent following a second and final round of 
divestitures.  
 
2.3.2 Importance of Market Analyses 
Varying results for market alterations employed in the England and Wales 
deregulation process provides reason for continuous reassessment of current market 
conditions to ensure the original intention of a market change was in fact achieved.  If 
England and Wales had ceased its deregulation process at the initial price cap with its 
consequential increase in price volatility or after the first round of divestitures with its 
associated increase in overall price level, there may have been detrimental long-term 
effects on the market.  Evidence of increased price level and volatility in this market 
combined with its strong influence on the deregulated market structures within the United 
States lends significant support to the importance of reassessment measures in the United 
States’ markets as well. 
The findings of Tashpulatov (2011) support the arguments of Hadsell et al. (2004) 
in his assertion that there are great benefits to studying and understanding price levels and 
volatility in electricity markets. The transition from government-set prices to wholesale 
competitive market has brought undeniable increases in both the overall price level of 
electricity as well as the volatility of these prices.  Hadsell et al. (2004, 24) reports that 
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the benefits to understanding these deregulation results includes, but is certainly not 
limited to, future spot price forecasting, electricity futures and energy derivatives pricing, 
and understanding the overall impact of deregulation.  Accurate predictions of future 
prices, in particular, are extremely vital to market participants, whose risk of involvement 
in the markets is highly correlated to volatility levels.  Risk reduction consequentially 
brings greater confidence to the utilities and generators with regards to their involvement 
and investment in the wholesale market. 
 
2.3.3 Structural Variations: California and New York 
The intended outcome of deregulation was to increase market competition and 
ensure that demand and supply of electricity met at the most economically efficient 
manner.  However, varying results have occurred, and this study continues with the 
contrasting examples of California and New York.  Both received approval from FERC 
for the formation of an ISO, and in 1998 and 1999, the California and New York ISOs 
(CAISO and NYISO) were respectively established.  However, the markets managed by 
each state’s ISO were quite different.  California’s system was split between two separate 
market operators: the Power Exchange (PX) managed the Day-Ahead (DA) spot markets 
via zonal pricing, while CAISO handled the grid operation, including congestion 
management, as well as ancillary services and the Real Time (RT) market (O’Neill et al., 
2006; Sweeney, 2006).  In contrast, NYISO handled both DA and RT markets.  These 
were conducted with Locational Based Marginal Pricing (LBMP), or the price at each 
network bus corresponding to the marginal cost of an additional increment of energy; in 
essence, LBMPs reflected the next least-cost resource available based upon transmission 
system constraints such as congestion (O’Neill et al., 2006; Sweeney, 2006).  In addition, 
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NYISO managed operating reserves and zonal Installed Capacity (ICAP).  However, 
these variations in structure were not the only factors resulting in the dramatically 
different outcomes of deregulation within these two states. 
 
2.3.4 Failed Outcome: California 
The structure taken by the CAISO markets as described above lent itself to the 
catastrophic deregulation failure that occurred in California.  Extensive studies have 
attributed the so-called California Electricity Crisis to this deregulation.  However, 
subsequent analyses suggest that it is not the fact that the California markets were 
deregulated but rather that the markets were only partially deregulated which ultimately 
led to extensive problems.  Littlechild (2006, xix) states, “the main problem, in short, was 
one of inappropriate regulation, and was not attributable to privatization or competitive 
markets per se.”   Sweeney (2006) contends that the California Electricity Crisis is 
actually a combination of an electricity and financial crisis, and neither of these were a 
direct result of deregulation. 
The western electricity crisis was primarily the product of a 
“perfect storm”, a combination of simultaneous adverse 
conditions, of flawed market rules, and only secondarily of 
exercise of market power and market gaming. The financial 
crisis was the direct result of California regulatory actions. 
However, the financial crisis was not the result of 
deregulation, but rather of inappropriate regulation. 
(Sweeney, 2006, 379-380) 
 
The continued regulation of certain aspects of the California markets was 
illustrative of acute government mismanagement (Sweeney, 2002, 10).  Legislation was 
originally issued with the intention of helping utilities recover stranded costs of 
investment in high-cost generation prior to deregulation with the predicted wholesale 
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price decrease; this was to be accomplished through a “competition transition charge” 
(CTC) issued by utilities to their retail customers (Sweeney, 2006, 327; 330).  However, 
these were first limited in size, then finally converted to retail-level price caps, set at 10% 
below their June 10, 1996 levels (Sweeney, 2006, 332-333), effectively ensuring price 
increases at the wholesale level were nontransferable to end-use consumers.  
Consequently, utilities were forced to absorb price shocks and retail prices did but reflect 
fluctuations in the wholesale market.  Sweeney (2002) argues that if this cap had not been 
established, price increases in the wholesale market would have been much smaller. 
Inappropriate governmental interference continued with the prohibition of the 
formation of long-term contracts.  This effectively prevented utilities from hedging 
against potential price fluctuations and forced them to purchase primarily in spot markets, 
where they were subject to uncertain but standard price volatility (Sweeney, 2006, 319; 
333).  The Manifesto on the California Electricity Crisis (2003) asserts that even with 
price caps preventing the transfer of price spikes to retail consumers, if utilities had not 
been purchasing 50% of their power on the sport markets, the financial crisis of the utility 
companies would have been mitigated.  Unfortunately this was not so, and when input 
prices rose for generators, utilities were forced to buy at a higher price than that at which 
they were capable of selling; indebtedness followed by bankruptcy were only to be 
expected.  This was the fate of two of the three largest utilities (Figure 2.1); PG&E filed 
for bankruptcy in April 2001 and SCE flirted with a filing for reorganization until they 
reached a rate agreement with the CPUC (Sweeney, 2006, 366). 
Consequences of “gross mismanagement by the California governor and the 
CPUC” were further exacerbated by adverse and unforeseen factors (Sweeney, 2006, 10).  
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These included summer heat waves in 2000 and an unusually cold winter of 2000-2001, 
where increased demand resulted in significant price spikes, as well as a corresponding 
widespread three-year drought that restricted critical hydroelectric generation (Manifesto 
on the California Electricity Crisis, 2003; Said, 2001).  Inadequate generation capacity 
inevitably led to increased prices on or near peak load.  Aggravation of the issue 
continued with limited natural gas pipeline infrastructure and skyrocketing gas prices, the 
input of which was required to power generators replacing the stunted hydropower 
(Sweeney, 2006, 345). 
Beyond these input issues, flawed structural market design enabled a number of 
market participants to game the system as well.  The most notorious of these market 
manipulators was Enron Corporation, whose operations caused drastic increases in spot-
market electricity prices.  Kranhold et al. (2002) reported on the release of memos 
describing Enron’s actions in the market, which revolved around two main market 
manipulations: (1) the creation of artificial congestion, of which CAISO would pay them 
to relieve; and (2) the “laundering” of electricity, directly in response to the price caps, 
whereby Enron would route electricity out of the state and then resell it back into the state 
at a price unrestricted by the in-state price cap.  The memos also named a number of 
other companies who embarked in price-gouging through artificial energy shortages, 
which included Reliant Energy, Inc., Dynegy, Inc., Mirant Corporation, and Williams 
Corporation (Kranhold et al., 2002, 2). 
These factors created what Sweeney (2006, 379) dubbed “the perfect storm,” all 
of which fed into the drastic price spikes that were so characteristic of the California 
Electricity Market Crisis and eventually forced Governor Gray Davis to declare the 
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California State of Emergency on January 17, 2001 (Said, 2001, 5).  Benini et al. (2002) 
models both the price levels and volatility of this market from 1999 through the end of 
2000 (Figure 2.3 and 2.4).  Not only does this modeling cover directly before the crisis, 
but also illustrates the electricity market’s meltdown as it occurs.  This provides ample 
ability to compare where “normal” prices were originally leveled to the drastically 
elevated prices of the crisis as well as the impressive increase in price volatility from 
1999 to 2000.  In addition, Benini et al. (2002) draws attention to the relative lack of 
volatility in prices during 1999 and the first half of 2000, prior to the meltdown.  Even 
with the occurrence of doubling gas prices in early 2000, this market exhibits an 
impressive stability.  It must therefore be inferred that the price volatility during the 
second half of 2000 was caused by the lack of generating capacity during the high 
demand and artificial energy shortages created by manipulating market participants. 
 
Figure 2.3: Two-Weeks Average Prices in California Markets 
1999 – 2000 
(Source: Benini et al., 2002) 
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Figure 2.4: Two-Weeks Price Volatility in California Markets 
1999 – 2000 
(Source: Benini et al., 2002) 
 
2.3.5 Successful Outcome: New York 
In contrast to the extensive degree to which California has been analyzed (the 
authors discussed above are just a minute portion of the bulk of material available), much 
less attention has been given to New York.  Perhaps the “blame” can lie to some degree 
with the success in which New York has transitioned through the deregulation period.  
NYISO’s Independent Market Advisor stated, “the transition to competitive electric 
markets have been remarkably smooth given the unprecedented scope of this effort” 
(NYISO, 2011, 10).  Littlechild (2006, 12) states that New York was, in fact, faced with a 
number of exogenous shock factors, including demand and fuel prices, which contributed 
to the utter ruin of the California markets, yet New York avoided the fate of California.  
Evidence provided by O’Neill et al. (2006, 518) suggests that it is due to the prior 
structure of the system as controlled by a power pool that allowed a smooth transition 
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into a deregulated state to occur.  The procedures and reliability functions already 
existed; it was primarily a matter of transferring power and altering some market rules. 
NYISO holds four core values regarding the management of the state’s 
transmission system: “(1) meeting New York’s power needs reliably and safely by 
managing its bulk electricity system; (2) running fair, open and competitive wholesale 
electricity markets; (3) planning for New York’s future power needs; and (4) leading the 
way in technology of tomorrow’s smart grid” (NYISO, 2011, ii).  The success of NYISO 
in achieving these goals is attributed to the “shared governance” of the organization, 
which includes both an Independent Board of Directors and stakeholder committees.  The 
latter group allows all involved parties, from transmission owners to end-use consumers 
to environmental groups, within NYISO’s system have an opportunity to voice their 
opinion on the rules and direction of the corporation (NYISO, 2011, 1).  In concrete 
terms of success, NYISO (2011) provided the following information in their Initial 
Decade Review, which reported NYISO’s accomplishments during the development of 
competitive markets: 
• Market participant numbers tripled, from 120 in 2000 to 360 by 
2008; 
• Dollar values of annual transactions doubled, from $5.2 billion in 
2000 to $11 billion in 2008; 
• Investment increased in new facilities and upgrades of current 
facilities; 
• Plant efficiency improved, such that the system-wide heat rate of 
fossil-fueled generation improved by 21%; 
• Average plant availability increased to 94.7%, which corresponds 
to an additional 2,000MW, or the amount generated by the 
investment in 4 new medium-sized plants; 
• Wholesale electricity prices (adjusted for fuel costs) declined 18%; 
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• Environmental performance drastically improved, such that power 
plant emission rates1 dropped by double digits between 1999 and 
2008 (NYISO, 2011) 
 
This organization has made undeniable strides in their progress after the 
deregulation of the markets.  In fact, their Independent Market Advisor reported, 
“NYISO markets are at the forefront of market design, and have been a model for market 
development in other areas” (NYISO, 2011, ii). 
 
2.4 NYISO Market Refinements 
Even with the projected success of the NYISO, the organization continues to 
make modifications to its rules and market structure in promotion of the most 
economically efficient and successful manner of running the state’s transmission system.  
The New York Public Service Commission reports that performance metrics 
incorporating NYISO’s continuous advancements “indicate that New York’s wholesale 
markets are among the most advanced in the nation” (Tierney and Kahn, 2007, 7).  While 
this paper cannot hope to encompass the copious range of actions the NYISO has made to 
enhance its system, this section will give a brief overview of an assorted group of these 
measures. 
 
2.4.1 New Generation 
New generation is intrinsically linked to a decrease in price levels and volatility, 
particularly if developed in areas with limited generation capacity or afflicted by 
constraints on the transmission system.  From 2000 to 2006, Tierney and Kahn (2007, 7) 
reported that 5,000 MW of new generation capacity (or about 15% of total capacity in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Power plant emission rates are measured in tons per year of the following components: sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides, and carbon dioxide (NYISO, 2011, 4). 
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2007) was brought online.  As is evident of the new generation records in Figure 2.5, 
these were particularly focused in Long Island and New York City, which are notoriously 
under-supplied.  In 2011, NYISO reported that an additional 2,600 MW had been added 
to the transmission system in the succeeding three years, 80% of which had been 
established in the two high-demand areas listed before, as well as the Hudson Valley 
Zone (Figure 2.6).  New generation combined with the enhancements to existing 
generation as referenced previously, has extensively contributed to alleviating price 
spikes that occur when nearing or reaching peak load. 
	  23 
Figure 2.5: New Generation Records by NYISO Transmission Area 
2000 – 2006 
(Source: Tierney and Kahn, 2007) 	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Figure 2.6: New York Zonal Load Map 
(Source: NYISO Market & Operational Data) 
 
2.4.2 Demand Response 
Demand response (DR) programs are extremely effective instruments used to 
lessen the effects of high electricity demand during peak-load hours.  Albadi and El-
Saadany (2007, 3) present numerous benefits to the installation of a demand response 
program; of particular relevance to this paper is their assertion of the direct correlation to 
the improvement of market performance through the reduction in price volatility.  
NYISO has installed a number of market-based DR programs, which include: the Day-
Ahead DR Program (DADRP), which allows companies to give bids of reduction, or 
“negawatts” into the DA market as generators; the Emergency DR Program (EDRP) and 
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ICAP Special Case Resource (SCR) Program, both of which reduce peak load during 
energy shortages through shut-down notifications given to participants, who are primarily 
commercial and industrial consumers; and Demand Side Ancillary Services Program, 
which allow retail consumers the ability to bid load curtailment into the DA and RT 
markets (NYISO, “NYISO Demand Response Programs,” 2012).  In 2002, it was 
estimated that 400MW were shaved from peak demand on consecutive record 
consumption days at the trigger of EDRP (NYISO, “NYISO Timeline,” 2012).  This 
impressive reduction in demand would have aided in depressing price spikes and 
volatility that inherently occurs as demand nears generation capacity limits.  
 
2.4.3 Standard Market Design (SMD2) 
On February 1, 2005, NYISO deployed its current Standard Market Design 
(SMD2).  At a cost of $32 million over two years, this project established RT and DA 
markets on a common platform (NYISO, 2005).  The shared platform was intended to 
increase the convergence of RT and DA prices, reducing volatility, and provide better 
historical data to “allow for more informed, precise and economical dispatching decisions 
(NYISO, 2005, 1).  The transition to this new system was facilitated by the co-operation 
of the old and new processes for one week during this period, which allowed for a 
smooth and successful changeover (NYISO Insider, 2005).  While this deployment was 
relatively recent, future analyses will be vital in understanding its overall impact.  
However, this has been arguably the most significant alteration to the New York markets 
since their deregulation, reflecting NYISO’s understanding and belief that this “era of 
competitive markets…are more complicated than ever and require the most sophisticated 
hardware and software available.  SMD2 gives us that” (NYISO, 2005, 1). 
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2.4.4 Virtual Bidding 
The implementation of virtual bidding in November 2001 was of particular focus 
to Hadsell (2007).  This market function operates financially settled bids rather than 
physically contracted agreements, providing both entry into the electricity market field by 
an increasingly large array of participants as well as a means of hedging against volatility 
in the markets by physical bidders (Hadsell, 2007, 66).  Hadsell (2007) states its 
designation was to decrease the discrepancy between DA and RT prices as well as 
general price volatility within the markets; his findings presented statistical proof that the 
installation of this program was, in fact, associated with a reduction in price volatility. 
 
2.5 Summary 
Electricity markets have undergone significant changes throughout the last two 
decades, beginning first and foremost with the deregulation process.  The post-
deregulation markets experienced significantly different outcomes, most notably 
contrastive being the catastrophic meltdown in California and the successful transition of 
New York.  Continued refinements of the New York markets provide ample material for 
reappraisal and analysis of the results of deployed mechanisms and policies.  This was 
utilized by Hadsell (2007), whose study has provided a means by which to calculate the 
“success” of certain market implementations conducted by NYISO through the 
determination of their influence, positive or negative, upon price volatility.  Using the 
methodology of Hadsell (2007) that is discussed in depth in the subsequent section, this 
study will model three policies as well as an additional extraneous factor for each 
variable’s associated effect on RT price volatility in the NYISO markets. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Econometric Technique and Analytical Approach 
  This chapter describes the data and its associated variable specifications as well as 
the model to be used during the analysis.  The objective is to determine the impact of 
specific policies and effects on price volatility.  To accomplish this end, a Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model will be used to model 
the conditional variance, or volatility, of a constructed return series of real-time prices.  
Inclusion of variables for specific policies or events within the variance equation will 
facilitate the examination of each variable’s effect on the volatility of electricity prices. 
 
3.1 Data 
This research focuses on determining the effect of three specific NYISO policies 
and one exogenous factor on price volatility within New York’s electricity markets.  The 
implemented model described below attempts to capture the effect of each variable, 
which includes both implemented market design measures and potential causes of 
variability, within the Capital Zone.  There is no precise reason for the selection of this 
representative zone, and each zone will show different levels of volatility based upon 
location.  The Long Island and NYC Zones will undoubtedly show relatively higher price 
volatility, while those in the western area of the state will show less varying levels 
(Figure 2.6).  One might presume that the Capital Zone is both physically situated, in 
relation to generation location, and well-populated to show a moderate or “average” level 
of volatility for the state. 
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  All data used herein are available from the New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO) as a collection of time series data covering the time span of January 2, 
2006 through December 31, 2012.  This range is selected because it provides the seven 
full years of operational data following the implementation of Standard Market Design 
(SMD2) on February 1, 2005.2  During this seven-year time span, 2,534 daily data points 
are observed.  This figure does not include twenty-three dates and associated data due to 
certain characteristics of the data as described in greater detail below.  Descriptive 
statistics for the data of the following variables are provided in Table 3.1 (Appendix A). 
 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable: Return Series of Price 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Locational Based Marginal Prices (LBMPs), as used in 
NYISO’s markets, are unique to each zone of the state.  They reflect the marginal cost of 
adding the next lowest-priced megawatt of energy to the system in $/MWh (NYISO, 
“NYISO Glossary,” 2012).  For the purpose of this study, an average daily value is 
calculated from the Time-Weighted/Integrated Real Time (RT) Zonal LBMP.  RT prices 
are selected because these spot prices are the basis for driving Market Participant (MP) 
behavior.  The fact that they are “Time-Weighted/Integrated” simply indicates that 
NYISO has calculated an average price over that hour from the five-minute increments of 
which it exists.  There exist twenty-four hourly intervals for one day, except during Day-
Light Savings Time (DST) transitions, during which there are either twenty-three or 
twenty-five intervals.  Similar to the methodology of Hadsell (2007), a return series of 
these average daily RT prices was constructed as , where  is the price 
at time t; this is captured by the variable P_RS.  Figure 3.1 provides a visual presentation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See the discussion of SMD2 in Chapter 2: Overview and Review of Existing Literature. 
€ 
Rt = ln(Pt /Pt−1)
€ 
Pt
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of the volatility of this return series.  The following dates are removed from the set 
because the return series calculation is impossible due to the negative value of the daily 
average, per the aforementioned formula: 1/1/2006; 7/1/2006; 7/2/2006; 7/23/2008; 
7/24/2008; 7/26/2009; 7/27/2009; 8/28/2011; and 8/29/2011. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Return Series of NYISO Capital Zone Average Daily RT Prices 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
(Source: NYISO Market & Operational Data) 
 
3.1.2 Exogenous Variables 
To capture movement within the mean equation, three exogenous variables are 
included.  Integrated Real-Time Actual Load, or volume of demand for electricity, is 
captured by the LOAD variable.  While load in the markets is originally constructed in 5-
minute increments, similar to the RT prices, NYISO provides this integrated value as the 
average load over the entire referenced hour measured in MW.  A daily average has been 
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calculated from these hourly values, which exist in twenty-four hourly intervals, except 
during DST transitions, as described above. 
NYISO provides a prediction of hourly load, or a forecasted volume of demand, 
on an hourly basis to help ensure the appropriate level of generation is prepared to meet 
demand.  It is modeled for each zone based upon weather forecasting information and 
historic load and weather data (NYISO, “NYISO Load Forecasting,” 2013).  These 
forecast data have been used to calculate a daily average, measured in MW, and captured 
by the variable FRCST.  As referenced above, there are dates that lack associated data; 
this is not the same as saying the forecast of the day has a value of “0 MW.”  Thus the 
data of the following dates were removed due to their lack of forecasting data: 
10/16/2007; 3/1/2008; 5/21/2008; 1/26/2011; 1/30/2011; 1/31/2011; 11/6/2011; 
11/7/2011; 1/26/2012; and 1/27/2011. 
Average marginal costs of congestion within the Capital Zone for this period are 
captured by the CONG_AVG variable.  These data refer to the existence of one or more 
constraints within the transmission system and reflect an inability to economically 
dispatch electricity at the most efficient level (NYISO, “NYISO Glossary,” 2012).  This 
occurs due to physical limitations on the network that prohibits least-cost generation from 
meeting load requirements; the cost of dispatching the next generator is the marginal cost 
of congestion (CARIS 2011, 2012, 73).  A daily average has been constructed from the 
hourly values provided by NYISO, measured in $/MWh. 
 
3.1.3 Explanatory Variables 
To capture the effect of certain events on price volatility, three policy 
implementations and one exogenous event factor were tested within the variance equation 
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of the model.  The first chronological market implementation was mitigation for the Lake 
Erie Loop Flow incident (LE08).  The term “loop flow” is defined as the difference 
between the scheduled bid of energy flow and physical movement of energy (Clamp, 
2010).  In this case, market participants were scheduling energy bids on a circuitous path 
around Lake Erie from New York through the markets of NYISO, Ontario’s Independent 
Electricity System Operator (IESO), Midwest Independent Transmission System 
Operator (MISO), and PJM Interconnection (Schnell, Docket No. ER08-1281-000, 2008). 
In reality, eighty percent of scheduled electricity, flowing in the path of least resistance, 
was physically moving directly across the border of NYISO and PJM (FERC, Docket 
Nos. ER09-198-000 and ER09-198-001, 2008). 
While scheduling bids in this manner was financially profitable for the market 
participants due to transmission pricing rules, “these unscheduled flows exacerbate[d] 
west-to-east constraints in New York, and thereby increase[d] congestion costs,” 
resulting in market fluctuations and uplift charges, or the cost of relieving the congestion 
(FERC, Docket Nos. ER09-198-000 and ER09-198-001, 2008; Clamp, 2010).  To resolve 
this issue, NYISO received permission from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) for a tariff provision on July 22, 2008, prohibiting this action by market 
participants (Schnell, Docket No. ER08-1281-___ (sic), 2008).  Inclusion of this market 
adjustment as a variable will determine if this was successfully associated with a 
reduction in price volatility, which would support the importance and benefit of attentive 
analysis and mitigation of market issues.  The data for days prior to the execution date 
will hold a value of 0 for this variable, while all those after will hold a value of 1. 
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Renewable energy is an integral and growing aspect of the future of energy.  
NYISO has established wind as “a rapidly growing segment of New York’s power supply 
and an essential element of the state’s portfolio of renewable resources” (NYISO, 2011).  
Appropriately incorporating these new sources of energy are extremely important as to 
ensure a reliable supply of energy across the system.  The following two variables 
encompass strides forward made by NYISO with regards to wind resources.  On June 18, 
2008, NYISO received approval from FERC for the mandatory participation of these 
resources in providing meteorological data for a centralized wind forecasting system 
(NYISO, 2010).  This would allow the NYISO to more accurately predict the energy 
output by wind resources within the system (FERC, Docket No. ER08-850-000, 2008). 
To understand the effect of the implementation of a centralized wind forecasting system, 
the variable WIND_FRCST will be modeled such that days prior to the execution date 
will hold a value of 0, 1 otherwise. 
The second variable to encompass NYISO’s wind resource incorporation efforts 
occurred on May 12, 2009 when NYISO received approval from FERC to fully integrate 
wind resources into its economic dispatch process (NYISO, 2010).  Wind is inherently 
intermittent; in addition, these resources can only be established in areas with specific 
characteristics favorable for a wind farm (Figure 3.2).  This clustering effect combined 
with intermittent energy production can cause constraints upon the system (FERC, 2009). 
During these times, NYISO proposed wind units be treated as flexible resources by its 
grid operators.3  This wind energy management initiative was intended to “improve the 
economic efficiency of the real-time market, compared to prior practice” (FERC, 2009).  
Therefore, the establishment of this market measure will be incorporated as the variable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Please see FERC (2009) for more information on the establishment of wind units as flexible resources. 
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WIND, whereby all data of days prior to May 12, 2009 will hold a value of 0, 1 
otherwise. 
 
Figure 3.2: NYISO Existing and Proposed Wind Generation 
2009 
(Source: Yeomans, 2010) 
 
A number of uncontrollable factors have significant impact on price volatility.  
Accurate forecasting of weather-related events can help prepare for the effects of nature 
and is therefore an extremely important aspect of electricity market operation.  However, 
adverse conditions such as thunderstorms will still have some effect on reliability of the 
system and, consequently, electricity prices (NYISO, MST Section 2 ‐ Definitions, 2012, 
5).  Thunderstorm Alerts (TSAs) can be issued quite frequently given the weather 
patterns of New York State during certain seasons and initiate a region-specific 
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conservative system operation through the reduction of transmission transfer limits 
(NYISO, “NYISO System Conditions,” 2012).  Specifically, “NYISO applies the 
requisite transmission constraint sets to redispatch the transmission grid in a fashion that 
reliability is effectively supported for the N.Y.C. region” (NYISO, §8.1.7.1: Storm Watch 
Costs, 2013, 8.4-8.5).  In essence, generation is turned on within the New York City Zone 
in anticipation of outages due to lightening strikes; the start-up and minimum generation 
costs of these generation units as well as the congestion issues resulting from the 
conservative approach to operation impacts electricity prices (NYISO, §4.1.8: 
Commitment for Reliability, 2013, 11).4  The effect of a TSA on price volatility will be 
captured using the variable TSA; this variable will hold a value of 1 when such an event is 
issued, 0 otherwise.  To code this variable to these characteristic values, it was first 
necessary to convert the End Time Stamp of the limiting constraint data, issued in five-
minute increments, to an associated Begin Time Stamp.  Once all date-linked data was 
combined, any day with an associated TSA event was coded as 1, those without as 0.  
Finally, the following dates and coupled data are removed due to their lack of limiting 
constraint data: 11/12008; 9/5/2010; 3/30/2012; and 5/24/2012. 
 
3.2 Analytical Approach 
3.2.1 Model Selection 
Much like the work of Hadsell (2007), the methodology of this study will use a 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model.  This tool 
uses past values of the dependent and independent variables (Equation 3.3.1) to model 
the conditional variance, or volatility, of a variable (Equation 3.3.2), in accordance with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For more information on costs corresponding to TSAs, please reference NYISO §4.1.8: Commitment for 
Reliability (2013) and NYISO §8.1.7.1: Storm Watch Costs (2013) 
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Chapter 24: ARCH and GARCH Estimation (2010).  Inclusion of variables for specific 
policies or events within the variance equation will facilitate the examination of each 
variable’s effect on the volatility of electricity prices. 
 
3.2.2 Model Specifications 
The modeling for this analytical approach will employ one regression for each of 
the four explanatory variables.  These will be individually tested within the GARCH 
model as variables in the variance equation.  In all regressions, the return series of RT 
price (P_RS) will run as the dependent variable of the mean specification.  All three 
exogenous variables, LOAD, FRCST, and CONG_AVG, will be included in the mean 
equation as well.  Therefore the GARCH specification will assume the following form: 
 
(3.2.2.1)  
(3.2.2.2)  
 
Within the variance equation, the variable EV refers to the specific explanatory 
variable for each test; thus the model will be run once for each of the aforementioned 
policies and events.  Characteristic of a dummy variable, the existence of the explanatory 
policy or event gives the variable a value of 1, 0 otherwise.  The ω variable is a constant 
term, representative of the mean.  The ARCH ( ) and GARCH ( ) terms refer to 
news of the previous period’s volatility and the previous period’s forecasted variance, 
respectively.  Of importance to this paper are the coefficients of the variance 
specification.  The coefficient of the explanatory variable, γ, indicates the effect of this 
factor on volatility.  Per Hadsell (2007), a negative value signifies the variable is 
associated with a reduction in volatility; a positive value indicates the opposite.  
€ 
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Additionally, the coefficients of the ARCH and GARCH terms, α and β, respectively, are 
used in the calculation of the point estimate of persistence.  The calculation (α+β) is 
equal to the “time taken for volatility to move half-way back to its unconditional mean 
following a given deviation,” whereby shocks are transitory in nature if the value holds at 
less than 1 (Hadsell, 2007, 71).  Conversion of this basic calculation through the 
following formula provides this measurement in days: 
 
(3.2.2.3) Half Life = ln(1/2)/ln(α+β) 
 
Through this methodology, it is expected that the three implemented policy 
variables, LE08, WIND_FRCST, and WIND, will show an associated reduction in price 
volatility after their effective date by means of a negative coefficient value.  Conversely, 
TSA is predicted to possess a positive coefficient, reflecting the associated increase in 
price volatility when such an event is issued. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Analysis of Empirical Results 
 This chapter presents the econometric findings regarding the determinates of price 
volatility in New York’s electricity markets.  As described in Chapter 3, the analysis used 
a GARCH model of the return series of Real Time NYISO Locational Based Marginal 
Prices (LBMPs) as a function of past values of the dependent and exogenous variables.  
As expected, the results indicate associated reductions in price volatility related to the 
implementation of the Lake Erie Loop Flow mitigation measures; the establishment of a 
centralized wind forecasting system; and the inclusion of wind resources in NYISO’s 
economic dispatch.  The model confirmed Thunderstorm Alert (TSA) events were 
associated with an increase in price volatility.  Additionally, TSAs exhibited more than 
four times the effect on price volatility than the average effect of the other three 
implementations, as measured by the absolute value of each variable’s coefficient. 
 
4.1 Lake Erie Loop Flow Mitigation 
The mean equation for this model ran the return series of the average daily price 
(P_RS), constructed in Chapter 3, as a function of past values of the dependent variable 
and the exogenous variables: average daily load (LOAD), or volume of demand; the 
average daily forecast (FRCST), or predicted load; and the average daily congestion 
(CONG_AVG), with an error term, .  The conditional variance equation contained the 
ARCH variable, , GARCH variable, , and dummy variable for the Lake Erie Loop 
Flow, LE08, whose value changed from 0 to 1 on June 22, 2008, marking the 
€ 
ε
€ 
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2
€ 
σt−1
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implementation of mitigation measures that prohibited circulation of energy around Lake 
Erie. 
 
(4.1.1)  
(4.1.2)  
 
As is evident from Table 4.1 (Appendix B), all variable coefficients are 
statistically significant at better than a 1% level.  The negative coefficient on the dummy 
variable LE08, indicates, as predicted, that the implementation of this market measure 
intended to relieve congestion and the associated price increases correlates to a decline in 
price volatility.  This is visually confirmed in Figure 4.1, where there is a roughly visible 
decrease in conditional variance around this period.  From the coefficients on the ARCH 
( ) and GARCH ( ) terms of the variance formula, it is possible to determine the point 
estimate of persistence; constructed as described in Chapter 3, it would take 
approximately 5.15 days for volatility to revert half-way back to its unconditional mean. 
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Figure 4.1: Conditional Variance of NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility 
Lake Erie Loop Flow Mitigation (LE08) 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
4.2 Wind Forecasting 
To understand the effect of the implementation of a centralized wind forecasting 
system, the conditional variance equation of this model was altered accordingly.  The 
mean equation remained a model of the return series of the average daily price (P_RS) as 
a function of the exogenous variables average daily load (LOAD), average daily forecast 
(FRCST), and average daily congestion (CONG_AVG), with the error term, .  The 
conditional variance equation remained constant in its inclusion of the ARCH ( ) and 
GARCH ( ) variables, but varied in the included dummy variable; the establishment of 
wind forecasting was modeled by the variable, WIND_FRCST, whose value and thus 
existence of legislation changed from 0 to 1 on June 18, 2008. 
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(4.2.1)  
(4.2.2)  
 
All coefficients are statistically significant to the 1% level in this model (Table 
4.2, Appendix B).  Focusing on the coefficient, , of the dummy variable WIND_FRCST, 
its negative value indicates that the introduction of this forecasting system for wind 
resources in New York’s electricity markets is associated with a decline in price 
volatility.  Rough visual confirmation is provided in Figure 4.2, where there is a decline 
in conditional variance values around this deployment period.  Calculated from the 
ARCH ( ) and GARCH ( ) coefficients of the variance formula, the point estimate of 
persistence identifies a measure of approximately 5.16 days following a given deviation 
for before volatility has moved half-way back to its mean. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Conditional Variance of NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility 
Wind Forecasting (WIND_FRCST) 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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4.3 Economic Dispatch of Wind Resources 
Associated effect of the full incorporation of wind resources into the system’s 
economic dispatch was analyzed with the same modeling process.  The return series of 
the average daily price (P_RS) was modeled as a function of the independent variables 
average daily load (LOAD), average daily forecast (FRCST), average daily congestion 
(CONG_AVG), and the error term, .  The dummy variable WIND was introduced to the 
conditional variance equation to represent the implementation of this wind energy 
management initiative, the value of which changed from 0 to 1 on May 12, 2009.  The 
remaining ARCH ( ) and GARCH ( ) variables remained constant. 
 
(4.3.1)  
(4.3.2)  
 
This model revealed that all coefficients, excluding that of the dummy variable, 
WIND, hold statistically significant at a 1% level (Table 4.3, Appendix B).  The 
coefficient of the dummy variable WIND was negative and significant at a 10% level, 
holding all else constant.  This signifies that the inclusion of wind resources in economic 
dispatch is correlated to a decrease in price volatility, which is visually confirmed in 
Figure 4.3.  Construction from the ARCH ( ) and GARCH ( ) coefficients of the 
number of days for volatility to move half-way back to its mean after a divergence 
formula estimates a point estimate of persistence of 4.90 days. 
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Figure 4.3: Conditional Variance of NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility 
Economic Dispatch of Wind Resources (WIND) 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
4.4 Thunderstorm Alerts 
The model for the effect on price volatility of Thunderstorm Alerts (TSAs) 
utilized the identical mean equation, whereby the return series of the average daily price 
(P_RS) was a function of the exogenous variables average daily load (LOAD), the 
average daily forecast (FRCST), and the average daily congestion (CONG_AVG), with an 
included error term, .  The conditional variance equation contained the ARCH variable  
( ), GARCH variable ( ), and a dummy variable for days of Thunderstorm Alerts, 
TSA, which held a value of 1 on dates with recorded TSA events and 0 on those without. 
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As is evident from Table 4.4 (Appendix B), all coefficients are statistically 
significant at a 1% level.  The dummy variable TSA, of which this paper is concerned, has 
an associated positive coefficient.  This indicates, as expected, the issuance of a TSA 
event is correlated to an increase in price volatility.  This is visually confirmed in Figure 
4.4, where the frequency of TSA events is illustrated by the much more volatile 
conditional variance when compared to Figures 4.1 through 4.3.  The point estimate of 
persistence, as constructed From the ARCH ( ) and GARCH ( ) coefficients of the 
variance formula, estimates that the time span during which volatility would revert half 
way back to its unconditional mean would be approximately 0.79 days. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Conditional Variance of NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility 
Thunderstorm Alerts (TSA) 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The analytical models used herein found the three indentified market deployments 
executed by NYISO have been associated with a successful reduction in price volatility.  
This characteristic holds true following the prohibition of circuitous bid scheduling 
around Lake Erie, mitigation put in place to resolve the Lake Erie Loop Flow issue and 
the resultant congestion that produced market fluctuations and uplift charges.  In addition, 
there was an associated reduction in price volatility with the establishment of a 
centralized wind forecasting system that provided NYISO with a more accurate 
prediction of energy output produced by wind resources.  Finally, this association was 
characteristic of the incorporation of wind resources in NYISO’s economic dispatch in 
order to help resolve the issue of system constraints resultant of concentrated but 
intermittent energy generation. 
This study also explored the impact of the anticipatory announcement of 
Thunderstorm Alerts (TSAs) on price volatility.  Preparation after the issuance of a TSA 
requires generation start-up in New York City; typically, start-up costs in conjunction 
with line congestion due to operational measures highly impact electricity prices.  When 
analyzed as an explanatory variable within the GARCH model, there was an associated 
increase in price volatility.  The effect of a TSA event on volatility compared to the 
implementation of the three volatility-reduction policies was over four times greater in 
magnitude. 
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5.2 Policy Implications 
As the United States and New York State move farther into the era of deregulated 
electricity markets, the twin goals of efficiency and reliability remain important and 
worthy of research.  Numerous studies have been conducted on price volatility in markets 
around the world; these have included, but have certainly not been limited to, modeling 
the markets of England and Wales (Tashpulatov, 2011); Spain, California, UK, and PJM 
(Benini, et al., 2002); and Australia (Thomas and Mitchell, 2007).  However, very few 
studies had been conducted on the New York markets thus far, the primary source for this 
document being the analysis of Hadsell (2007) on virtual bidding.  This study revealed 
the successful reduction in price volatility associated with a number of specific policies 
within the Capital Zone.  Frequently, new market mechanisms are enacted with the belief 
that they will improve the market, but the results are rarely assessed adequately.  Studies 
like these support continued research into the post-effects of market design measure 
implementations, where both positive outcomes as well as potential negative market 
responses may occur; post-execution studies ensure fine-tuning and perhaps even policy-
reversal efforts are implemented in timely manner. 
Explanatory variables included in this particular study lend support for continued 
analysis of the current market design.  The Lake Erie Loop Flow response provides 
support to the importance of market monitoring and mitigation efforts.  Market 
participants, though acquitted of any charges of market manipulation or tariff violation by 
FERC, were certainly taking advantage of pricing knowledge for profit purposes (Clamp, 
2010).  While this particular loop flow was corrected through NYISO’s circuitous 
prohibition measures, the organization also implemented “rigorous monitoring 
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procedures to provide transparency and to better address congestion costs,” which 
included “a daily review of market outcomes to identify unusual or unexpected market 
outcomes to identify the root-cause source of certain uplift and other marketplace costs” 
(Clamp, 2010).  Undeniably, constant and meticulous monitoring of the markets is 
required to maintain a state of equilibrium.  Studies like this one address the benefits of 
market monitoring to general market welfare; while it was determined that uplift charges 
were reduced, this policy was associated with an additional overall reduction in price 
volatility. 
Accurate forecasting is an extremely important aspect of market operations, and 
this study supports advancements both in terms of weather and load.  First and foremost 
is the consideration of uncontrollable but oftentimes-predictable natural occurrences.  If 
the market is prepared for these events through accurate forecasting efforts, the impacts 
may be somewhat alleviated.  TSAs allow the market to ramp up generation in 
preparation of potential line outages; implementation of these events undoubtedly helps 
reduce drastic price fluctuations that would occur if reliability of the system was 
threatened.  While it is important to understand that the announcement of a TSA will 
cause temporary volatility in the markets, accurate forecasting allows market participants 
to prepare for both requests for additional generation as well as expected price 
fluctuations consequential of a TSA. 
Forecasting weather comes into effect with regards to wind resources as well.  
This study found that providing detailed information to NYISO for maintenance of a 
centralized wind forecasting system facilitated improved forecasting of energy 
production by wind resources.  Further enhancements were made with the full 
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incorporation of wind resources into the economic dispatching system.  Both of these 
measures taken to improve the reliability of this renewable energy source on the 
transmission system helped alleviate price volatility in the markets. 
Green energy appears destined to play a growing role in the future of electricity 
markets.  However, the nature of this power production is quite unique, such that 
generation is often intermittent and clustered in areas favorable to the source of energy.  
Careful and continuous analysis should be taken before and after the assimilation of 
renewable energy resources to ensure optimized integration into the electricity markets 
and continued transmission system reliability. 
 
5.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
The modeling of this paper was successful in documenting the impact of these 
variables on price volatility.  Nevertheless, there are certainly areas for further research as 
well as some shortcomings of the current research that should be discussed. 
First and foremost, expansion of data to include all zones of the New York 
Control Area would be advantageous in understanding both the impact of the analyzed 
factors within each additional zone as well as the their more general, market-wide effect.  
This study focused on market information exclusively related to NYISO’s Capital Zone.  
This is only one of eleven zones in the New York transmission system, and as such, 
provides only one view of the data.  Logically, it seems unlikely that there would be a 
price volatility effect reversal of any of the four analyzed variables; this is supported by 
the results of Hadsell (2007), who determined that virtual bidding was associated with a 
statistically significant reduction in RT price volatility in all zones, excluding the Long 
Island Zone.  However, while the four explanatory variables analyzed herein may not 
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reverse their impact on price volatility, the magnitude of the effect of each may vary in 
different regions of the state. 
In terms of the variables analyzed herein, it may happen that the Lake Erie Loop 
Flow variable has more impact on zones in the western region of the state bordering this 
lake where congestion may have concentrated; therefore, while the variables certainly 
show effect on volatility in the Capital Zone, the associated coefficient in the West could 
be notably higher.  In continuation of location-based analysis, the concentrated presence 
of wind generation in the northern and western regions of the state (Figure 3.2) may 
cause interesting effects on the magnitude of the WIND and WIND_FRCST variable 
coefficients specific to these zones as well (Yeomans, 2010).  Typically, these areas will 
have characteristically lower prices with the existence of congestion in the system, 
inhibiting the easy movement of this generation to demand-intensive locations (Hausman 
et al., 2006, 4).  Volatility may already be reduced due to the excessive supply of 
generation and therefore these variables may have less effect.  Conversely, forecasting 
and economic dispatch of these resources could enable smoother transfers of energy 
across constraints; these variables could, in turn, have the same or greater effect as they 
held in the Capital Zone.  In both instances, limiting the scope of the study to the Capital 
Zone has inhibited an understanding of the broader market spectrum.  Expansion of zonal 
data for this study will confirm each variable has the same associated effect across the 
state and will be more useful for a market-wide analysis of the events. 
This data expansion would have the additional benefit of resolving the issue 
regarding the removal of twenty-three dates and associated data due to their lack of 
usable data.  Any time data must be removed, there is an assumed effect of some 
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magnitude on the results of the analysis.  Fortunately, this data set is expansive, with 
seven years of hourly data converted to daily averages, producing 2,557 unique data 
points; the elimination of twenty-three points removes only 0.9% of the original data.  
Therefore, the effect from the removal of these dates is presumed to be minimal. 
While cross-sectional data expansion is indeed important, it would be beneficial 
to expand the time span of the study as well.  The implementation of Standard Market 
Design (SMD2) on February 1, 2005 was arguably the most crucial development in the 
New York markets to date (NYISO, 2005, 1).  Analyzing the associated impact of this 
market change on price volatility would be exceedingly valuable and would require an 
expanded time span of data.  However, keep in mind that it may be crucial to impose time 
span constraints when analyzing individual market adjustments and policies, based on 
their unique implementation dates.  The drastic market changes that occurred as a result 
of SMD2 severely altered the data prior to and after this date; using a dataset spanning 
this marker may reflect less the impact of the explanatory variable and more the 
overwhelming effect of SMD2.  Dependent upon the relative deployment date of the 
analyzed policy, limiting data to before or after the SMD2 implementation date may 
become crucial. 
Further investigation of additional market implementations as well as adverse 
conditions like TSAs and their effects on price volatility in NYISO markets would be 
useful to understand what impacts the system and where further investigation and efforts 
should be focused.  Relating directly to this study, there was an adjustment made to the 
centralized wind forecasting system in 2010.  From that point forward, wind resource 
participants were obligated to provide meteorological data for a five-kilometer radius 
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around each turbine at a constant thirty-second stream of data for NYISO’s forecasting 
efforts (Yeomans, 2010).  Whether this adjustment was beneficial in terms of price 
volatility would be a useful focus of analysis.  Not only would it show the benefit of wind 
forecasting, it would also indicate the value of continued analysis and fine-tuning of 
already-executed market implementations.  Furthermore, additional analysis conducted 
on renewable energy sources is extremely valuable as the electricity industry moves 
steadily forward in its efforts to research and incorporate additional sources of green 
technology. 
While analyzing the impact of the implementation of certain market mechanisms 
has its benefits in determining the successes and failures of these policies, approaching 
the issue of price volatility from a different angle may provide even greater insight into 
this issue.  This study began by researching policies and modeling their impact on price 
volatility; an alternative approach would be to identify periods of less volatility and 
attempt to uncover the trigger that sparked this reduction.  This may be an appropriate 
way to uncover the mechanisms that caused the periods of relative calm that can be seen 
in the graph of the return series of prices in Figure 3.1.  Noteworthy of this figure as well 
are the distinct periods of high volatility.  This methodological approach could also be 
used to research the causes of these extreme price fluctuation episodes. 
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APPENDIX A 
Data 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum Observations5 
      
Dependent Variable      
P_RS 0.0008 0.3174 4.3782 -2.8266 2534 
      
Exogenous Variables      
LOAD 1311.956 159.2651 159.2651 921.1958 2534 
FRCST 1271.602 152.1447 152.1447 917.1667 2534 
CONG_AVG -12.0989 24.0556 24.0556 -260.93 2534 
      
Explanatory Variables      
LE08 0.6342 0.4818 1 0 2534 
WIND_FRCST 0.6476 0.4778 1 0 2534 
WIND 0.5193 0.4997 1 0 2534 
TSA 0.0837 0.2769 1 0 2534 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing 
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11; 
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12.  For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique 
and Analytical Approach. 
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APPENDIX B 
Regression Estimations 
 
Table 4.1: NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility and Lake Erie Loop Flow Mitigation 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Variable/Coefficient Coefficient Value Standard Error Significance (p-stat) Calculated Term Calculated Value 
      
Mean Equation      
LOAD λ1 0.0009 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
FRCST λ2 -0.0008 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
CONG_AVG λ3 -0.0014 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
      
Variance Equation      
Constant ω 0.0154 0.0009 ** 0.0000 (α+β) 0.8740 
LE08 γ -0.0034 0.0010 ** 0.0006 Half-Life 5.1475 
ARCH ( ) α 0.2610 0.0156 ** 0.0000   
GARCH ( ) β 0.6130 0.0121 ** 0.0000   
 
Effective Date of LE08: July 22, 2008 
Number of Observations: 2,5346 
** Statistically significant at 1% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing 
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11; 
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12.  For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique 
and Analytical Approach. 
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Table 4.2: NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility and Wind Forecasting 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Variable/Coefficient Coefficient Value Standard Error Significance (p-stat) Calculated Term Calculated Value 
      
Mean Equation      
LOAD λ1 0.0013 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
FRCST λ2 -0.0013 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
CONG_AVG λ3 -0.0009 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
      
Variance Equation      
Constant ω 0.0155 0.0009 ** 0.0000 (α+β) 0.8744 
WIND_FRCST γ -0.0035 0.0010 ** 0.0004 Half-Life 5.1644 
ARCH ( ) α 0.2608 0.0156 ** 0.0000   
GARCH ( ) β 0.6136 0.0121 ** 0.0000   
 
Effective Date of WIND_FRCST: June 18, 2008 
Number of Observations: 2,5347 
** Statistically significant at 1% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing 
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11; 
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12.  For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique 
and Analytical Approach. 
	  58 
Table 4.3: NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility and Economic Dispatch of Wind Resources 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Variable/Coefficient Coefficient Value Standard Error Significance (p-stat) Calculated Term Calculated Value 
      
Mean Equation      
LOAD λ1 0.0014 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
FRCST λ2 -0.0013 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
CONG_AVG λ3 -0.0008 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
      
Variance Equation      
Constant ω 0.0146 0.0008 ** 0.0000 (α+β) 0.8682 
WIND γ -0.0034 0.0010  * 0.0827 Half-Life 4.9049 
ARCH ( ) α 0.2644 0.0156 ** 0.0000   
GARCH ( ) β 0.6038 0.0122 ** 0.0000   
 
Effective Date of WIND: May 12, 2009 
Number of Observations: 2,5348 
** Statistically significant at 1% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing 
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11; 
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12.  For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique 
and Analytical Approach. 
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Table 4.4: NYISO Capital Zone RT Price Volatility and Thunderstorm Alerts 
January 2, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Variable/Coefficient Coefficient Value Standard Error Significance (p-stat) Calculated Term Calculated Value 
      
Mean Equation      
LOAD λ1 0.0009 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
FRCST λ2 -0.0008 0.0001 ** 0.0000   
CONG_AVG λ3 -0.0014 0.0002 ** 0.0000   
      
Variance Equation      
Constant ω 0.03734 0.0021 ** 0.0000 (α+β) 0.4154 
TSA γ 0.1562 0.0087 ** 0.0000 Half-Life 0.7891 
ARCH ( ) α 0.2985 0.0223 ** 0.0000   
GARCH ( ) β 0.1170 0.0274 ** 0.0000   
 
Number of Observations: 2,5349 
** Statistically significant at 1% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This figure does not include the following dates due to negative average prices, resulting in an incalculable daily return series value, and/or missing 
forecasting and/or TSA data: 1/1/06; 7/1/06; 7/2/06; 10/16/07; 3/1/08; 5/21/08; 7/23/08; 7/24/08; 11/1/08; 7/26/09; 7/27/09; 9/5/10; 1/26/11; 1/30/11; 
1/31/11; 8/28/11; 8/29/11; 11/6/11; 11/7/11; 1/26/12; 1/27/12; 3/30/12; 5/24/12.  For more detail, please reference Chapter 3: Econometric Technique 
and Analytical Approach. 
